Poor Planning: Investors who Save Regularly Save Less Overall
Séminaire de Indigo JONES
Prochain séminaire du GAINS
Poor Planning: Investors who Save Regularly Save Less Overall
Le 23 avril 2024
Le prochain séminaire du GAINS aura lieu le 23 avril 2024 de 10h30 à 12h00 en salle T204.
Indigo Jones, en thèse à l'Université d'Orléans (sous la direction de Sylvain Benoit, Béatrice Boulu-Reshef, et Alexis Direr), présentera "Poor Planning: Investors who Save Regularly Save Less Overall".
Abstract: Scheduling regular deposits is consensus popular financial advice, but does doing so actually increase savings? Perhaps not. In a dataset of 36,836 robo-advisor clients who saved an average of €21,602, investors who scheduled deposits saved 32.6% (€8,630) less overall than investors who did not schedule deposits, and still 16.0% (€3,466) less than average ceteris paribus. Yet, investors who started or stopped scheduling deposits saved €3,247 more during those years in which they were scheduling deposits. Additionally, many factors such as an investor's age, sex, number of children, income, wealth, investment horizon, ESG status, investment goal, and financial literacy were significantly related to an investor's decision whether to make scheduled deposits and/or how much they eventually saved.
Un lien zoom est disponible pour ceux qui ne peuvent pas assister au séminaire en présentiel:
https://univ-lemans-fr.zoom.us/j/96596996697?pwd=ZWc0L0hrdFZKU08vZWY1b05PUUhBZz09
Meeting ID: 965 9699 6697
Passcode: 392326
