Séminaire d'Olivier L'HARIDON

Séminaire d'Olivier L'HARIDON

Le 12 novembre 2024

Le prochain séminaire du GAINS aura lieu le 12 novembre 2024 de 10h30 à 12h00 en salle T204. Olivier L'Haridon (Université de Rennes 1) présentera "Bargaining with Reference Points, Theory & Experiment" coécrit avec Noemi Navarro (CREM, Université de Rennes).

Abstract: We explore the implications of bargainers' reference-dependence preferences on bargaining outcomes. We focus on the case where bargainers are loss averse with respect to the reference point and consider Nash's four original axioms with two additional axioms to account for reference-dependence: independence to the reference point (r-independence) and invariance with respect to the Shalev transformation (order- independence). We first show that there is no solution satisfying all those axioms, while the disagreement solution (i.e., recommending disagreement at any bargaining problem) is the unique solution satisfying all those axioms except replacing Pareto efficiency with individual rationality. We then propose a new solution, characterized by four axioms (Pareto efficiency, scale invariance, contraction independence - also known as IIA -, and a strong axiom of symmetry), that coincides with the Nash bargaining solution under certain conditions.

Un lien zoom est disponible pour ceux qui ne peuvent pas assister au séminaire en présentiel:

https://univ-lemans-fr.zoom.us/j/99838625897?pwd=8O1bHpLNb0momxwmB2BXb9WOo3y22o.1

Meeting ID: 998 3862 5897
Passcode: 852657