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Séminaire de Carolina MORENO FLOREZ

Séminaire de Carolina MORENO FLOREZ

Séminaire de Carolina MORENO FLOREZ

ombre public de dos conférencier en fond flouté

Le prochain séminaire du GAINS aura lieu le 03 décembre 2024 de 10h30 à 12h00 en salle T204. Carolina Moreno Florez (Le Mans Université) présentera "Seeking optimality while reducing inequalities: The role of transfers in income redistribution" coécrit François Langot.

Abstract: Redistribution is a vast subject with many different facets. In this paper, we focus on income redistribution through taxes and transfers, and we propose different basic setups to study optimal redistribution, depending on the level and the progressivity of taxes; and types of transfers, which could be Bismarckian and/or Beveridgien. We study the mechanisms of redistribution and the trade-offs involved in the design of a redistribution system, so that the system can be redistributive and efficient at the same time. Besides, different countries implement different strategies of redistribution with different outcomes in terms of output (efficiency concern) and inequalities (redistribution concern). So then, who is doing better ? Or from a theoretical point of vue: what does optimality look like when redistribution takes place?. We address this question in two stages : in a first step, we use exogenous incomes, determined solely by "chance" (rich or poor by luck) ; in a second step, we implement endogenous labor supply, i.e. incomes depend not only on "chance" but also on "merit", determined by labor supply decisions or individual effort. In the first case, we show that optimal redistribution always results in complete equality. In the second case, adding "merit" shifts the result away from the equality previously found.

Un lien zoom est disponible pour ceux qui ne peuvent pas assister au séminaire en présentiel:

https://univ-lemans-fr.zoom.us/j/94330819955?pwd=KqaZNzaidbmYC0XtVeczKhxFUVDH0a.1

Meeting ID: 943 3081 9955
Passcode: 547953

 

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